

# ENDPOINT SECURITY: A STEALTHY APPROACH TO CYBER DEFENCE

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# Methodology Used

- Review of popular Endpoint solution used in the security operation centers(SOC).
- Review of related works (50) -publications, patents, articles, whitepapers, conferences/workshops; from 2000 to July 2021
- Survey and Questionnaire from security analyst,

# Objectives

- ❑ To practically review challenges of endpoint security base on: the people, process and technology
- ❑ Outline expectations to maintain balance between effectiveness of endpoint security and productivity
- ❑ To guide decision makers on the minimum yardstick for a better endpoint security, instead of vendor bias approach or random selection

## Internet Usage Category

<b>Student/Tutor</b>	MOOC, YouTube, reading sites, streaming
<b>Internet Addict</b>	Use more applications, check almost everything
<b>Socializers</b>	Instant messengers, forum, dating sites
<b>Basic</b>	Search engines, emails, IM
<b>Presenter</b>	Write blogs, articles or topics in forum
<b>Businessmen</b>	e-commerce site, stocks, travelling, news
<b>Gamer</b>	Plays online games

# Endpoints

## TRADITIONALLY:

Endpoint are internet connected hardware (workstations)

## NOW:

Servers, Tablets, Printers, Smart Devices, Internet of things(IOTs), point of sales terminal(POS), mobile phones.


*...a URL in an API or EC2 instances is an endpoint that enable users to interact with server resources.*



[www.entrepreneurhandbook.co.uk/the-internet-of-things/](http://www.entrepreneurhandbook.co.uk/the-internet-of-things/)

# Why Endpoint ?

Reference	Statistics
IBM –Ponemon Institute May 28th, 2021	<input type="checkbox"/> \$4.28million –Av. cost of a breach globally <input type="checkbox"/> 78% Breaches
	<input type="checkbox"/> 64 % of Breaches –Confirmed by 3rd party
Dataprot	<input type="checkbox"/> 560 000/Day –New malwares Strains
IBM – 2020	<input type="checkbox"/> 228 days –Average time to detect <input type="checkbox"/> 80 days –Average time to contain



# Attack Trend

## The Creeper Worm:

*'I am the creeper; catch me if you can'*

## ELK Cloner:

*'The program with a personality  
It will get on all your disks  
It will infiltrate your chips  
Yes it's cloner!  
It will stick to you like glue  
It will modify ram too  
Send in the Cloner!'*

Melissa, Jerusalem, Morris Worm, CIH, ILoveYou, code red, slammer, mybloom, mpack, Asprox botnet, Gumblar, Stuxnet

Heartbleed, Duqu, ZeroAccess, flame, Crypto locker, Reveton, Locky, Mirai Botnet, WannaCry, Emotet, Petya, Trick Bot, Maze, Regassus, Ryuk, Kaseya  
...

Relatively Benign

Harmful

Extremely Malicious

Bob Thomas, 1971  
(*Experimental Work*)  
&  
Richard Skrenta, 1982  
(*Practical Joke on Friends*)

1980s – 2010

2011 – Till Date

Advanced Persistent Threat(APT) Groups




# Attacks Are Smart

- Packers, polymorphic code and lateral movement attacks
- Signature bypass:  
Automated code permutation, register renaming, shrinking or expanding code, insertion of dump code
- Delayed Execution  
Logic bomb, stalling code, extended sleep
- User interaction, system properties, environmental awareness(e.g Carbanak, blacksquid malware)

```

main.c
1  #include <stdio.h>
2
3  int main()
4  {
5      int indicators = "Sandbox";
6
7      if (indicators=="Sandbox")
8      { // checking if in analysing environment
9          printf("Suspend Action!\n");
10     }
11     else
12     { // Real endpoints -VMS not detected
13         printf("Execute Malicious Payloads\n");
14     }
15
16     return 0;
17 }
  
```

Output: /tmp/CbAHcKgDzA.o  
Suspend Action!





# Evolution In Attacks

## WHAT HAS CHANGED?

- Increasing Sophistication(the 'A' in APT)
- Increasing Scale(Count)
- Attack types (Malware to Fireless)
- More dangerous threat actors' motivations
- Heavy Impact (Risk Analysis)

### **Malwares:**

Backdoors, worms, virus, crypto miners, trojans, rootkits, ransomware.

### **Exploiting legitimate files For Malicious Use:**

*Fireless Attacks:* Malicious scripts(PowerShell, WMI), dll, macros.


Digitally signed or OS whitelisted malwares, Living Off the Land Binaries/LOLBAS projects(LOLBins, LOLScript, LOLLib)

### **Threat actors:**


Researchers, hackers, Advanced persistent threat(APT) groups

Lazarus Group, Lazarus Group, Fancy Bear, Cobalt Group, FIN7, Mirage, Magecart, Equation Group, OilRig, Comment Crew, Syrian Electronic Army, PLATINUM, Anonymous, Numbered Panda, Dynamite Panda, Cozy Bear, Elfin, Charming Kitten, Ricochet Chollima, Mythic Leopard, Sodinokibi, Muddy Water, Patchwork, Energetic Bear, Sandworm Team, OceanLotus, APT39, APT35, APT34, APT33, APT41 etc.

# Trend in Anti-Malware Products




# Endpoint Security Overview



# CHECKBOX FOR ENDPOINT SECURITY SOLUTION

- ❖ *Products and solutions to protect systems and data*



aws.amazon.com

# Deployment/Asset Coverage

## Expectations

- Compatibility with existing tools/controls e.g AV, agents
- Ease of deployment e.g large environment, diverse OS and architectures, environment(cloud/ on premise)
- Installation requirement should not be too resource intensive
- Offline protection for agent-based

## Situations

- Complexity in deployment process.
- Failure of solution to integrate with existing controls: no aggregated threat view
- Analyst navigates several management console to investigate suspicious behaviours
- Adversaries target workloads in the cloud

# Use Case Implementation

## Expectations

- Need to localize policy, update watchlist
- Capable/Flexible of assigning reputations: blacklist and whitelist
- Interactive API design(excellent documentation, support)

## Situations

- Organization face different threats
- Variation in Client's Architecture, Infrastructural Setup
- Rigid solution: unable to meetup with customizations required by blue teams

# Security Activities on System Resources

## Expectations

- Security activities of EDR should not be resource intensive
- Lightweight agents/sensor

## Situations

- Periodic scanning of enormous event artifacts by endpoint security solutions and analyst queries
- Devices are slow/hang; denial of service due to excessive system resource utilisation
- End-users often forced to disable security solution



# Useful Frameworks/Knowledge Base

## Challenges:

- Questions, justification for each investigations/conclusion : why, how, ... ?
- Emphasis on attack stages instead of the in depth overview of threats




[www.lockheedmartin.com](http://www.lockheedmartin.com)



## Expectations

- Must be simple, interpretable model, plugins
- Knowledge bases optimized for reference



[The Unified Kill Chain](#)

# Integrated Threat Intelligence

## Expectations

- Combination of threat intelligence, inbuilt correlation rule enables an optimized and real time detections
- Facilitates automated response actions
- Scan endpoint traffic for IOCs of known threats.

## Situations

- Numerous malware released every 24 hrs, globally not in sync into the endpoint solution
- Vendors taking long to release new signature
- False negatives/positives (accuracy, fidelity)

# Automation Capability

## Expectations

- Scheduled agent/updates push, scans e.g off-peak period; spool/send reports
- Auto prevention of malwares, scripts, exploits, macros; remediation actions.  
(consolidated playbooks)

## Situations

- Analysts complained of alerts fatigue  
-overwhelming low level activities
- End-user often hesitate to roll updates
- Diverse data with unique properties;  
hence require separate interpretations  
(user, host, file/documents)

# Consolidated Process Visualization

## Expectations

- Contextual view, quick holistic view

...IOCs: extent/duration, attack stage/path/vector, breach status, C2, data accessed/Exfiltration etc.

- Process workflows from initial foothold to data harvesting, showing attack paths
- Ease of Navigation
- Relationship between correlated events

## Situations

- Enormous notifications;  
“short investigation : resolution”  
timeline
- Security incidents are aggregated from series of smaller events, not a single events

# Log Retention Policy

## Expectations

- Durable storage of low-level event artifacts e.g  $\geq 1$  years.
- Storage can be scalable based on subscription plan, instead of being the default.
- Logs should be easy to query/reference on need basis

## Situations

- Logs of prolonged attacks are often purged before investigation are completed.
- Threat actors lurk in the environment for months(years) before the actual attacks (the 'P' in APT group attacks)

# Enhanced Threat Hunting

## Expectations

- Access to large scale, unfiltered data lake
- Easy to use query syntax
- Excellent documentation, forums

## Situations

- Evasive threats in the environment
- Data is rigidly structured by inbuilt analytics
- Query syntax are either too complex or not robust enough

# Visibility Into Endpoints' Health

## Expectations

- Insight into system resources for statistics related to memory, compute, storage
- Digital fingerprinting of properties like device type, battery details, user's informations
- Discovery of outdated programs, enhanced virtual patching, advisory reports

## Situations

- Incomplete visibility into the health status of sensors, devices, associated files



# Advanced Threat Detections

## Expectations

- Early detection, accurate and precise classification engines i.e bad, suspicious, benign, failed or successful attempts
- Effective priority/severity/ or allocation of threat score
- Provision for analyst input: open, closed, resolved

## Situations

- Inaccurate detections
- Large backlogged alarms heavily requires analyst validation

# Integrated ML

## INPUT Stage:

Data from problematic software, normal programs from forums, threat feeds etc.

Benign  
Files

Malicious  
Samples

Extract  
Properties

Train  
Model

Test/Deploy  
Model

Static Analysis

Dynamic analysis:  
proc, sys, netconn,  
memory monitoring

## OUTPUT Stage

**Automated  
Detection  
&  
Response**

### Data Properties

Strings,  
imports/Exports,  
Opcodes, section  
entropy, code  
entropy, auto  
method call,  
callByNames,  
AutoExecMethod  
, XOR operator  
etc.

### Machine Learning Model

Supervised learning(e.g. logistic regression, back propagation neural neural networks, using random forests, decision trees etc.), unsupervised learning(e.g. Apriori algorithm, K-means clustering), Semi-supervised learning, reinforcement learning(e.g. Q-learning algorithm, temporal difference learning). Regression algorithm(e.g. ordinary least squares, logistic regression, stepwise regression, multivariate adaptive regression splines, locally estimated scatterplot smoothing, etc.) an instance-based method (e.g. K-nearest neighbor, learning vector quantization, self-organising map, etc.), regularisation method(e.g. ridge regression, least absolute shrinkage and selection operator, elastic net, etc.), decision tree learning method(e.g. classification and regression tree, iterative dichotomiser 3, C4.5, chi-squared automatic interaction detection, decision stump, random forest, gradient boosting machines etc.), a Bayesian method (e.g. naive Bayes, averaged one-dependence estimators, Bayesian belief network, etc.), kernel method(e.g. support vector machine, radial basis function, linear discriminate analysis etc.), a clustering method(e.g. K-means clustering, expectation maximisation, etc.), associated rule learning algorithm(e.g. apriori algorithm, Eclat algorithm etc.), artificial neural network model(e.g. perception method, back propagation method, Hopfield network method, self organising map method, learning vector quantization method etc.), deep learning algorithm (e.g. restricted Boltzmann machine, deep belief network method, convolution network method, a stacked auto-encoder method etc.), a dimensionality reduction method(e.g. principal component analysis, partial least squares regression, Sammon mapping, multidimensional scaling, projection pursuit etc.), ensemble method(e.g. boosting, bootstrapped aggregation, AdaBoost, stacked generalization, gradient boosting machine method, random forest method etc.). Others probabilistic, heuristic or deterministic module etc.

### SOME MODEL USED IN EDR FROM YEAR 2000

SVM, RSVM, Threshold Random Walk(TRW), glyph-based visualisation, graph-based representation, dendric cell algorithm(DCA), Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System(ANFIS), Rate limiting(RL), maximum-Entropy(ME), Linear regression, Deep learning, multi-path exploration, MLP, KNN, Deep Learning, TW SVM, TW Logistic Regression, Cumulative Sum, Logistic Regression, Hierarchy clustering approach, Ant Colony based Graph Theory(ACGT), Heuristic approach, Markov chain algorithm, Clustering, Sequential Minimal Optimisation(SMO), Naive Bayes, Decision Tree(J48, etc.) Logistic Model Tree(LMT), Random Tree, Random Forest, Self organizing feature Map(SOFM), Malware Operational Plot Review(MOPR), Bayesian Network, Logit Boost, Bagging, AdaBoost Gradient Boosting, Ensemble, Hoeffding Tree, Principle Component Analysis(PCA), Modified Apriori, Ensemble Recurrent Neural Network, akNN Knowledge-assisted visual analytics(KAVAS), IDS & forensics tool

# Response And Recovery

## Expectations

- Other response actions: uniquely terminate malicious process, and or subprocesses
- IR/Forensic Capability
  - support live mode via remote connection to execute commands, launch tools etc.
  - collection of running process, established connection, memory dumps, fetch system and application logs
- Complete roll back to last clean snapshot: revert files/config modified, terminate active sessions etc.

## Situations

- Security hardly goes beyond detection phase(... of what benefit is detection alone to ransomware, DOS attacks ?).
- Response action are mostly asset quarantine and malware removal; no recovery !

# OTHERS

## Expectations

- Offline protection of endpoints
- Ease of auditing user activities on the console
- Flexible role-based access on the management console
- Ease of spooling reports: executive view, technical, etc.

# CHECKBOX FOR PEOPLE AND PROCESSES

- ❖ *Teams, best practices or established mechanism to achieve cybersecurity program objectives*



[www.wgu.edu](http://www.wgu.edu)

# Process

- Delayed management approval
- Refusal/reluctance to give required privilege for troubleshooting, deployment
- Sales engineering team often oversells/overshoot product capabilities
- Policies(e.g BYOD ), procedures, compliance.
- IR & BCP Plan, SLA & performance metrics,
- Procedures for handling vendor/third parties.
- Drills and audits

# Blueteams/End-users

- Maximise the capability of Endpoint solution

NewYorkTimes breached vs Symantec 2013 ([www.theregister.co.uk/2013/02/01/symantec\\_responds\\_nyt\\_apl/](http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/02/01/symantec_responds_nyt_apl/) )

- Map configuration parameter impacting system resources; upgrade hardware, optimal testing
- Cross platform correlation during incidence investigations
- Routine user training and security awareness
- Enforce/Imbibe security best practices e.g EDR agents are some uninstalled, bypassed, for convenience



# OUT OF SCOPE

- Cost implication to implement each of these checkboxes
- Review of agent/agentless deployment, centralised and decentralised management
- Recommendation on perfect machine learning model for anti-malware detection engines or suitable vendors



# THANK YOU

email: [adewolenath@yahoo.com](mailto:adewolenath@yahoo.com)  
(Questions)