



SecurityScorecard

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# Hidden Risks of Advertisements

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# Advertising is (almost) everywhere

- Mobile apps and games
- Websites with 'free' content in general
- Youtube, facebook, google search results

Ad mediation platform examples: AdMob, ironSource, Mopub, ...

Ad network examples: AppLovin, AdMob, AdColony, ...

Verizon Media Native ad network states that it has 1B monthly active users

# Sinkholing opportunities


- expired hardcoded domains (2 use cases)
- usage of wrong domains (2 uses cases)
- available algorithmically generated domains (1 use case)

# Use Case 1

# Use Case 1 Details

- the case of an expired hardcoded domain
- advertising SDK
- used by ~40 Android applications, most of them are related to gaming
- contacted by more than half a million unique IP addresses daily

# Distribution



# Example of GET request with application

## GET

/m/gdpr\_sync?id=[redacted]&nv=5.5.0%2Bunity&current\_consent\_status=unknown&force\_gdpr\_applies=0&bundle=<application package>&dnt=0 HTTP/1.1

**User-Agent:** Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 7.0; SM-G935F Build/NRD90M; wv)

AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/79.0.3945.136

Mobile Safari/537.36

**Accept-Language:** pt-br

**Host:** [redacted]

**Connection:** Keep-Alive

**Accept-Encoding:** gzip

# Example of POST request with application

```
POST /m/gdpr_sync HTTP/1.1 {  
Accept-Language: th-th "current_consent_status":"unknown",  
User-Agent: Dalvik/2.1.0 (Linux; U; "nv":"5.5.0+unity",  
Android 9; FLA-LX2 "force_gdpr_applies":"0",  
Build/HUAWEIFLA-LX2) "id":"[redacted]",  
Content-Type: application/json; "dnt":"0",  
charset=UTF-8 "bundle": <application package>  
Host: [redacted] }  
Connection: Keep-Alive  
Accept-Encoding: gzip  
Content-Length: 172
```




# Use Case 2

# Use Case 2 Details

- the case of an expired hardcoded domain
- multi-platform advertising SDK
- contacted by more than 10 million unique IP addresses daily
- ~70% of those IP addresses are located in the United States
- used by 10,000+ websites, most are related to news and social media
- used by ~2,000 Android and iOS applications, most are related to news and social media

# Distribution



# Example of GET request with website

**GET** /sync/dsp?uid=[redacted]&partner=[redacted]&zone=[redacted] HTTP/1.1

**Host:** [redacted]

**Connection:** keep-alive

**User-Agent:** Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36  
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.61 Safari/537.36

**Accept:** image/webp,image/apng,image/\*,\*/\*;q=0.8

**Sec-Fetch-Site:** cross-site

**Sec-Fetch-Mode:** no-cors

**Sec-Fetch-Dest:** image

**Referer:** <URL>

**Accept-Encoding:** gzip, deflate, br

**Accept-Language:** en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8

# Example of GET request with application

**GET** /sync/dsp?uid=[redacted]&partner=[redacted]&zone=[redacted] HTTP/1.1

**Host:** [redacted]

**Connection:** keep-alive

**User-Agent:** Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.0.0; SM-G930V Build/R16NW; wv)

AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/75.0.3770.67

Mobile Safari/537.36 [FB\_IAB/FB4A;FBAV/245.0.0.39.118;]

**Accept:** image/webp,image/apng,image/\*,\*/\*;q=0.8

**Referer:** [redacted]

**Accept-Encoding:** gzip, deflate

**Accept-Language:** en-US,en;q=0.9


**X-Requested-With:** <application package>

# Use Case 3

# Use Case 3 Details

- unintentionally used wrong domain - advertisers bought the correct domain but distributed the SDK with the wrong domain (typo)
- browser and mobile advertising platform
- ~2.5 million unique IP addresses daily
- ~90% of IP addresses are located in Russia
- used by 20,000+ websites, most are related to gaming and movies
- used by ~1,000 different applications, most are related to social networking and browsing
- problem was fixed in a little over a week

# Distribution





# Example of request with website

**GET** /userbind?src=[redacted]&pbf=1&gi=1 HTTP/1.1

**Host:** [redacted]

**Connection:** keep-alive

**User-Agent:** Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/80.0.3987.149 Safari/537.36

**Sec-Fetch-Dest:** image

**Accept:** image/webp,image/apng,image/\*,\*/\*;q=0.8

**Sec-Fetch-Site:** cross-site

**Sec-Fetch-Mode:** no-cors

**Referer:** <website>

**Accept-Encoding:** gzip, deflate, br

**Accept-Language:** ru-RU,ru;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7

# Use Case 4

# Use Case 4 Details

- intentionally used wrong domain to evade syntax errors
- HTML5 advertising player
- the non-resolving domain was not meant to be contacted unless specific rare conditions were met
- received requests from half a million unique IP addresses
- problem was fixed in 2-3 days

# Code before fix

```
if (xam == 1) {
    var xameleon = 'https://ssp.xameleon.io/?[redacted]&page='+referer+' and ';
} else { var xameleon = ""; }
if (buz == 1) {
    var buzzoola = 'https://exchange.buzzoola.com/adv/[redacted]/jsvpaid';
} else { var buzzoola = ""; }
var player = new Playerjs({
    id:"player",
    file:"https://www.youtube.com/embed/"+id_arr_1.rand(),
    ...,
    preroll: "" + imhop + "" + ... + vhead + "" + xameleon + "" +
buzzoola + "https://321[redacted].ru"
});
```

# Code after fix

```
if (xam == 1) {
    var xameleon = 'https://ssp.xameleon.io/?[redacted]&page='+referer+' and ';
} else { var xameleon = ""; }
if (buz == 1) {
    var buzzoola = 'https://exchange.buzzoola.com/adv/[redacted]/jsvpaid';
} else { var buzzoola = ""; }
var player = new Playerjs({
    id:"player",
    file:"https://www.youtube.com/embed/"+id_arr_1.rand(),
    ...,
    preroll: "" + imhop + "" + ... + vhead + "" + xameleon + "" +
buzzoola + "https://[redacted]/player/html5/media/vpaid.xml"
});
```

# Example of request with website

**GET** / HTTP/1.1

**Host:** [redacted]

**Connection:** keep-alive

**Origin:** [redacted]

**User-Agent:** Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36

(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/78.0.3904.108 YaBrowser/19.12.4.25 Yowser/2.5

Safari/537.36

**Accept:** /

**Sec-Fetch-Site:** cross-site

**Sec-Fetch-Mode:** cors

**Referer:** <website>

**Accept-Encoding:** gzip, deflate, br


**Accept-Language:** ru,en;q=0.9




# Use Case 5











**Seller 1**














# Use Case Details


- multi-platform mobile advertising mediator
- integrates 70+ advertising providers
- uses a Domain Generation Algorithm as fallback for hardcoded domain, which generates:
  - 1 domain daily
  - 1 domain monthly
  - 1 domain yearly

# Communication flow


- hardcoded domain: [accessible](#)
- generated domains: not important



Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK



Mediator




Advertiser





Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK

1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain





Mediator




Advertiser



Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK



Mediator



Advertiser



Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK


1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain



2. send advertiser



3. request advertisement





Mediator




Advertiser



Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK



Mediator



Advertiser

# Communication flow

- hardcoded domain: **unreachable**
- generated domains: **belong to the mediator**




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK


1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain



blocked



Mediator




Advertiser




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK

1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain
2. request advertiser  
from generated domain

blocked




Mediator




Advertiser




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK



blocked



Mediator





Advertiser






Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK





Mediator





Advertiser



Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK



Mediator



Advertiser

# Communication flow

- hardcoded domain: **unreachable**
- generated domains: sinkholed




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK


1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain



blocked



Mediator



Advertiser




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK


1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain



blocked




Mediator



Advertiser


2. request advertiser  
from generated domain



Sinkhole

# Distribution

contacted by tens of thousands of devices



# Example of request

**POST** /get HTTP/1.1

**Host:** [redacted]

**User-Agent:** Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 13\_4\_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/609.1.20 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile/17E262 DManager/27

**Accept-Language:** fr-FR;q=1, ar-FR;q=0.9, en-FR;q=0.8

**Accept-Encoding:** gzip, deflate, br

**Content-Type:** text/plain

**Connection:** keep-alive

**Content-Length:** 1064

**Accept:** \*/\*

<body>

# Information about devices

## **Hardware characteristics:**

- device manufacturer, type, and model
- height, width and pixel ratio of the display
- the total and the available RAM
- percentage of battery

## **Software characteristics:**

- platform (android or ios)
- operating system version
- SDK version
- whether the device is rooted or not



# Information about users

- language
- time zone
- local time
- gender
- age
- relation
- occupation
- smoking
- alcohol

# Information about advertisements

- type of advertisement
- whether advertising tracking is enabled
- number of shown advertisements
- number of advertisements fully watched
- number of clicks

# Information about applications

- list of enabled advertisers
- install time
- uptime
- app key
- package name
- package version

# Applications

- used in ~2000 applications
- in top 10 applications sorted by number of received requests:
  - 1 application has almost one million installs
  - 1 application has almost half a million installs
  - 4 applications have a quarter of a million installs

# Communication flow

- hardcoded domain: **unreachable**
- generated domain: **belongs to a malicious third party**




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK


1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain



blocked



Mediator



Advertiser




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK


1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain



blocked



Mediator



Advertiser

2. request advertiser  
from generated domain



Fake Mediator




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK


1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain



blocked



Mediator




Advertiser

2. request advertiser  
from generated domain



3. send fake advertiser



Fake Mediator






Device running application containing mediator SDK

1. request advertiser from hardcoded domain



blocked



Mediator


2. request advertiser from generated domain



3. send fake advertiser




Advertiser



Fake Mediator

4. request advertisement



Fake Advertiser




Device  
running  
application  
containing  
mediator  
SDK

1. request advertiser  
from hardcoded domain



blocked




Mediator

2. request advertiser  
from generated domain



3. send fake advertiser




Advertiser


4. request advertisement




5. send fake advertisement



Fake Mediator



Fake Advertiser



Demo

# Possible Attacks

- impersonate mediator and provide specially crafted ads
- gather information about users and advertisers using the mediator and sell it on underground markets

# Comparison of use cases

Use case	Applications / Websites	Unique IPs per day	Platform	Fixed
Use case 1 (hardcoded domain)	~40	~500 000	Android	no
Use case 2 (hardcoded domain)	~10 000 websites, ~20 000 apps	>10 000 000	Android, iOS	no
Use case 3 (wrong domain)	~20 000 websites, ~1 000 apps	~2 500 000	mobile, browser	yes
Use case 4 (wrong domain)	unknown	~500 000	HTML5 player	yes
Use case 5 (DGA)	~2 000 apps	min ~60 000	mobile	no

# Conclusion

Attackers can easily sinkhole advertising infrastructure in order to create an infection vector targeting advertiser's user base.